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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
An Economic Analysis of Divorce in Hong Kong 
Submitted by SUEN Kin-fai 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Economics 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2000 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of divorce in Hong Kong. 
Both cross-sectional data and time-series data are used to examine who would have a 
higher probability of divorce and what factors can explain the pattem of the divorce rate. 
In the cross-sectional analysis of divorce, apart from the variables that are usually 
employed in the analysis of divorce, we also include some variables that may be unique 
to the situation of Hong Kong. Special attention is paid on the estimation of the 
interrelationship between the quantity of children and the probability of divorce. 
Furthermore, we examine whether sons and daughters would have different influence on 
the probability of divorce due to gender bias. In the time-series analysis of divorce, we 
use cointegration to examine how the divorce rate is affected by the birth rate, the female 
labour participation rate, economic prosperity and the sex ratio in the long run. In general, 
most of our estimation results are consistent with existing economic theories and 
expectation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
One of the most obvious changes in the family structure of Hong Kong is the 
increasing number of divorces. Diagram 1 shows the trend of divorce in Hong Kong. 
The crude divorce rate, which is defined as the number of divorce decrees per 
thousand of population, rises from 0.124 in 1974 to 1.613 in 1997. Due to the 
complicated legal procedures of divorce, the number of divorce decrees always lags 
behind the number of divorce petitions. Thus, instead of the crude divorce rate, a 
better measurement of the trend of divorce should be the number of divorce petitions 
per thousand of population. It increases from 0.182 in 1973 to 2.126 in 1997. Its 
magnitude is higher than that of the cnide divorce rate, but both of them show a 
similar increasing pattem of divorce. However, as only married people are subject to 
divorce and the marriage rate of Hong Kong is decreasing, both the crude divorce rate 
i 
and the number of divorce petitions per thousand of population would under-estimate 
the trend of marriage failure. In this sense, a more accurate indicator should be the 
number of divorce petitions per thousand of married population. In Diagram 1, we 
calculate the number of divorce petitions per thousand of married population. It 
increases from 2.560 in 1983 to 6.722 in 1996. Apart from being higher in magnitude, 
it increases faster than the other two measurements. No matter which measurement we 
are referring to, the sure conclusion drawn from this diagram is that divorce has been 
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becoming more and more common in Hong Kong. 
Diagram 1: Trend of divorce 
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One of the most concemed social problems resulting from the increase in the 
number of divorces is the increase in the number of single-parent families. Law (1991) 
compares the economic situation, life satisfaction and child care difficulty of single-
parent families with those of two-parent families in Hong Kong. He shows that 40.9% 
single-parent families are originated from voluntary dissolution and 82.3% of them 
are headed by females. 54% respondents of single-parent families report that their 
financial situation is worse off after divorce. 21.1% respondents of the single-parent 
families have low to very low life satisfaction as compared to only 2.3% of the 
respondents from two-parent families. 
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The increasing number of single-parent families imposes heavy financial burden 
on the government. It is because single-parent families have much higher rate of 
utilization of public service, such as legal aid, social work service, child day care, 
community service center and fmance assistance. Diagram 2 shows the total number 
ofsingle families receiving public assistance. It increases from 1,670 cases in 1973 to 
13,303 cases in 1997. Diagram 3 shows the real average expenditure that the 
government spends on each family receiving public assistance. Combining diagrams 2 
and 3，the estimated governmental real total spending on financial assistance for 
single families is calculated and is shown in diagram 4. It increases from $2,046,122 
inl979 to $30,682,061 in 1997.^  -
Diagram 2: Number of single families receiving fmanical assistance 
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Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics: 1974-197 
!It is noted that not all the single families considered in diagrams 2,3 and 4 are originated from marital 
dissolution. Thus, these diagrams may over-estimate how the increasing number of divorces imposes 
extra financial burden on the government. However, as we believe that a quite large proportion of 
smgle families are originated from divorce, these diagrams can still show the approximate trend ofhow 
the increasing number ofdivorces imposes extra financial burden on the government, at least to certain 
extent. 
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Diagram 3: Average expenditure for each case receiving financial assistance 
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Source: Hong Kong Axuiual Digest of Statistics: 1977-1998 
Diagram 4: Total expenditure on single families receving financial 
assistant 
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As divorce has become a common phenomenon，not only divorced couples are 
affected. Married couples would also be more likely to prepare for the event of 
divorce deliberately or undeliberately in order to protect their own interests and well-
being. One important instrument is the allocation of time within marriage. By 
investing more on human capitals, each partner is more able to secure his/her living 
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after divorce. However, the gain from such investments may detract from marital 
outputs. Hence，the increasing number of divorces may degrade the quality of marital 
life in general. 
In short, the increasing popularity of divorce increases the amount of single-
parent families and produces many social problems. In addition, this not only afFects 
those suffering from divorce, but also changes the pattem of family decisions in 
general. As there is no reason to expect the increasing trend of divorce to stop in the 
future, it is important to study this topic. 
For Westem societies, such as the U.S, Canada and Australia, similar change in 
the structure of family has occurred since the Second World War. A lot of efforts have 
been spent on the analysis of the determinants and the consequence of divorce by 
sociologists and economists in Westem societies. However, nearly nothing has been 
done in Hong Kong. As a first look at the problem of divorce in Hong Kong, diagram 
5 shows the crude divorce rate of Hong Kong and several Westem countries. The 
crude divorce of Hong Kong is the lowest. Though the divorce rate of Hong Kong is 
very low, compared with Westem countries, it is increasing continuously. Hence, it is 
time to spend some efforts to study this issue. As the culture, traditional custom and 
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lifestyle between Hong Kong and Western societies are different, the applicability of 
the Western answer to the situation of Hong Kong can be tested by an empirical study 
only. The primary objective of this thesis is to quantify the influence of various factors 
on the marital instability of Hong Kong people using the theoretical framework 
developed in the economic literature, cross-sectional data from "1996 Population By-
Census" and time-series data from "Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics: 1977-
1999” 
D iag ram 5: The crude divorce rates of different countries 
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This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the economic theories of 
divorce that this thesis rests on. The data, variables, techniques and estimation results 
of the cross-sectional analysis are presented in Chapter 3. Ln Chapter 4, we use time-
series data to analyze the trend of divorce. The final chapter closes this thesis with the 
6 
summary of the main findings. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1) Idea of efficient divorce 
Becker pioneers the study of family issues with the use of economic tools. In his 
classical papers (1973，1974), he develops a set of theory for marriage which provides 
a lot of implication for further study. In Becker, Landes and Michael (1977), they 
introduce the idea of "efficient divorce" which is a direct extension of Becker's 
previous studies (1973, 1974). They assume that, conditional upon on the realization 
of the current information, people make marital decisions by maximizing their 
expected full wealth over the remaining course of their life. If spouses expect that 
their full wealth derived from their joint marital outputs are greater than the -
combination of their flill wealth derived from separated outputs after divorce, they 
stay in the current marriage. If not, they choose to divorce. This rule of "efficient 
divorce" can be satisfied if any allocation of resources between partners are feasible. 
For example, if this condition of divorce is not satisfied and one fmds that he/she 
would gain by divorce, his/her spouse would give him/her larger share of marital 
outputs in order to keep hinVher to stay in the current marriage. On the other hand, if 
this condition ofdivorce is satisfied and one finds that he/she would lose after divorce, 
his/her spouse would give him/her compensation in order to "bribe" him/her to agree 
with divorce. 
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This idea of "efficient divorce" is further re-expressed in the form of dynamic 
equation by Weiss (1997). For a pair of spouses, their gains from marriage are 
specified as a household production function. This household production function is 
measured in terms of the husband's personal traits, x t^, the wife's personal traits, x,^, 
the amount of marital specific capitals, k^ , and the quality of matching, Q ^ . Some of 
these variables are fixed from the outset of getting married, but some of them may 
vary with time. Hence, the subscripted "t" in each of the above variables allow them 
to change with time. With this setting, the household production function can be 
written as g,= G(Xh:, x^, k,, 61). 
However, once they decide to divorce, the above household production function 
does not represent their utility level any more. What they can get after divorce is 
measured by Aht(xJ and A ^ ( x J for the husband and the wife respectively. Each of 
them is a function of individual traits only. As they choose to dissolve their marriage, 
they need to bear the costs of divorce. It includes psychological costs, legal costs, and 
the loss due to the heavy depreciation of the marital-specific capitals. Hence, the costs 
of divorce can be written as Ct(k ,^ s^ ), where s^  represents various components of 
divorce settlement. 
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Let Yt be a vector including all exogenous variables, x ,^, x^, k^and6'^, and be 
governed by the process of stochastic difference. At time t, y； = /3y\.j + ^【，where 
/5 is the matrix of coefficients and /z ^  is the vector of unanticipated shocks. In this 
dynamic framework, the decisions about marry and divorce can be characterized with 
the aid of a "value function", V(yj). Define 
V(Yt) = G(yt) + B E_[Vt+i(yt+i),八…川 + � + 「C 』 
where B is a discounting factor lying between zero and one and E^  is the expectation at 
time t applying to all possible realization of future unanticipated shocks. At the time 
of getting married, spouses expect that their gains from marriage are larger than the 
sum of their value of alternatives. If their expectation at the time of marriage were -
perfectly correct, no divorce will occur. So, obviously, it is the unexpected change in 
exogenous variables ignites the risk of divorce. If unexpected shocks cause spouses to 
re-evaluate their gains from marriage or costs of divorce downward, or re-evaluate 
their value of alternatives upward, such that V(yJ falls below A^^+ A^r C„ they 
would divorce. But it is worth emphasizing that this direction of unexpected shocks 
does not surely lead to divorce. If their original gains from marriage or costs of 
divorce are high enough, or their value of alternatives is low enough, a minor shock is 
not sufficient to make them dissolve. 
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By Weiss' equation, it is easy to find that all the exogenous variables and the 
unexpected changes in these exogenous variables affect the decision of divorce by 
three major channels: they are the gains from marriage, the costs of divorce and the 
value of alternatives. In the following, we discuss how various factors determine the 
likelihood of divorce through these channels in 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. At the end of this 
chapter, we summarize what have been found in previous studies in 2.5. 
2.2) Gains from marriage and divorce 
The larger the gains from marriage, the less likely a couple would divorce. 
Usually, economists focus on how the division of labour between spouses, the quality -
of matching, the amount of marital-specific capitals and unanticipated shocks affect 
the gains from marriage. Recently, some economists broaden their interest and take 
spouses' shared time and taxation system into consideration. Each of them will be 
discussed in detail from 2.2a to 2.2f. 
2.2a) Division of labour 
Division of labour between spouses in the market and non-market sectors is 
frequently quoted as an important source of the gains from marriage. The higher the 
degree of the division of labour between spouses, the larger the gains from marriage 
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would be. Becker(1974) shows explicitly that ifhusbands have higher wages or wives 
have higher productivity in housework work, the gains from marriage (or marital 
outputs) can be maximized by husbands specializing in the market sector and wives 
specializing in the non-market sector. As one's income can reflect one's degree of 
participation in the labour market, it is expected that husbands' income is negatively 
and wives' income is positively related with the likelihood of divorce. This 
expectation is supported by Van der Klaauw (1996). He uses a life cycle model to 
show that the utility gains from marriage is increasing in husbands' earnings and 
decreasing in wives' earnings. 
Though marital outputs can be maximized by the division of labour between 
spouses, how much couples can produce depend on how well husbands perform in the 
market sector and how well wives perform in the non-market sector. As education can 
improve one's productivity in both the market and non-market sectors, it is natural to 
believe that, for a given division of labour between spouses, couples with higher 
educational level may enjoy larger gains from marriage and are more unlikely to 
divorce. This argument is consistent with the findings ofLehrer and Chiswick (1993)， 
and Weiss and Willis (1997). They find that both male and female education can 
reduce the probability of divorce. However, higher wives' education would induce 
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them to participate more actively in the labour market. This reduces the division of 
labour between mates and increases their probability of divorce. Thus, the influence of 
education on the stability of marriage is not necessary stabilizing. Instead, it may be 
destabilizing. Or, the stabilizing effect of education offsets its destabilizing one and 
yields ambiguity. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) find that education has 
ambiguous influence on the probability of divorce. 
It is always argued that the degree of female labour participation and their 
probability of divorce may be interrelated. Wives participating actively in the labour 
market would have lower gains from marriage and suffer from a higher probability of -
divorce. With a higher probability of divorce, they tend to participate more actively in 
the labour market in order to secure their living after divorce. As a result, their gains 
from marriage will be much lower and their chance of divorce will be much higher. 
Hence, the causality between the probability of divorce and the female labour 
participation may be bilateral. By the use of panel data, Johnson and Sinner (1986) set 
up a simultaneous model to estimate the interrelationship between the probability of 
divorce for married women and their labour supply. They find that those get divorced 
subsequently increase their labour supply in the three years prior to separation. But 
there is little significant evidence for how their labour supply affect their probability 
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of divorce. 
2.2b) The quality of matching 
The better the matching between spouses, the larger the gains from marriage and 
the lower the probability of divorce would be. Becker (1973, 1974) develops the 
theory of optimal assortative mating which suggests the way of matching between 
spouses according to their characteristic. By this theory, matching oflike is optimal if 
traits are complements, such as education, age, intelligence, non-human wealth, ethnic 
origin, height and religion. If traits are substitutes, matching ofunlike is optimal, such 
as income. Becker calculates the partial correlation of spouses' years of schooling and -
wage rate. He finds that the partial correlation of spouses' years of schooling is highly 
positive and the partial correlation of spouses' wage rate is weakly positive. Though 
the latter one is inconsistent with his theory, it does not necessarily lead us to reject 
his theory, since the problem of sample bias is present in his testing. Applying this 
theory on the issue of divorce, Lehrer (1988) shows that, for black women, ifthe age 
difference between husbands and wives is greater than six, their probability of divorce 
would be higher. For both white and black women, divorce is more likely if their 
spouses have different religion with them. Lehrer and Chiswick (1993) give an in-
depth analysis ofhow religious compatibility between spouses affects their stability of 
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marriage. He finds that interfaith unions have higher rate of dissolution than intrafaith 
unions. The destabilizing effect of out-marriage varies inversely with the similarity in 
the beliefs and practices of the two religions as well as with the mutual tolerance 
embodied in their respective doctrines. 
Even if one knows which type of spouse matches himAiQv the best, nothing 
guarantees he/she can match with such spouse as there are so many potential 
candidates in the marriage market. How well one can match with his/her spouse 
depends on how much he/she searches before getting married and how skillful of 
searching he/she is. Searchers search continuously until their marginal gain and -
marginal cost of additional search are equal. People having higher cost of searching 
would search less and are subject to higher chance of divorce, such as those get 
married at age much younger than average and wives with pre-marital birth. Lehrer 
(1988) uses Cox-regression model to show that women getting married at age under 
18, having pre-marital birth or pre-marital conception would have shorter "survival 
time" of marriage. 
People having rare traits, such as those with extremely high or low educational 
level，eaming ability, IQ, height, weight, or living in place where they are minority, 
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always have higher costs of searching, since it is more difficult for them to meet 
suitable spouses who have compatible traits with them in the marriage market where 
most of the potential candidates have typical traits only. It tums out that they search 
less，give up the gain from optimal matching and are exposed to a higher chance of 
divorce. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) use this argument ofrare traits to explam 
why Jews living in the communities with relatively few Jews are more likely to have 
intermarriage and suffer from a higher probability of divorce. Also, they use this 
argument to explain why the subjects in the Terman survey, all ofthem have IQ over 
135，have higher divorce rates.! 
After searchers meet their potential partners in the marital market, they carry out 
intensive search on their potential partners in the hope of getting better understanding 
about the attributes of their partners. Thus, co-habitation may serve to improve the 
quality of matching and prevent marital crisis after many However, empirical 
evidence for this argument is divergent. Georgellis (1996) finds that pre-marital 
cohabitation can reduce the chance of divorce, but Weiss and Willis (1997) just get the 
opposite. 
2 The subjects in the Terman survey were non-randomly selected from California elementary schools in 
1921 and had an IQ exceeding 135. They are in the top 1 percent ofthe IQ distribution. 
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2.2c) Marital-specific capitals 
Marital-specific capitals are defined as couples' investments that can increase the 
gains from marriage, but these investments would become substantially less valuable 
once the couples divorce. Sexual adjustment, knowledge of one's mate, specialized 
market and non-market skills used relatively more while married, and the rearing of 
own children are usually regarded as this kind of capitals. By this definition, marital-
specific capitals can deter divorce by two ways. One of them is by increasing the 
gains from marriage and the another is by increasing the costs of divorce. We discuss 
the first one in this section and keep the second one in a latter section. 
As marital-specific capitals are accumulated over time, couples with longer 
duration of marriage would have more marital-specific capitals and are less likely to 
divorce. This argument has been widely confirmed by previous studies. 
Among various marital-specific capitals, the most concerned one is the rearing of 
own children. In general, children may provide new bond, happiness (by altruism) and 
financial support (by old-age security hypothesis) for their parents. All of these 
contribute to larger gains from marriage and reduce the chance of divorce. Evidence 
for the stabilizing effect of children on marital relationship is so abundant and nearly 
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exists in all related studies. 
Instead of the unilateral influence of the quantity of children on the probability of 
divorce, some hypothesize that the probability of divorce and the quantity of children 
are interrelated. Those who have fewer children would face a higher probability of 
divorce; higher probability of divorce would scare them away to have more children 
since the costs of divorce is very heavy for couples with a lot of children. Becker, 
Landes and Michael (1977) regress the number of children on a set of independent 
variables. This set of independent variables includes those that have been frequently 
encompassed in the estimation of fertility and some others used to reflect the -
probability of divorce, such as spouses' discrepancies in race, educational level and 
age. They find that those suffering from a higher probability of divorce would have 
fewer children. 
Koo and Janowitz (1983) build up a simultaneous logit model to examine the 
interrelationship between the "recent" childbearing decision and the probability of 
"subsequent" divorce. In this analysis, they distinguish children into two types by the 
time of birth. The first one is whether couples give a new birth "within a short 
interval" just before their marital decisions. The second one is the number of older 
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children that they have already accumulated "before this short interval". They believe 
that both the probability of divorce and the accumulation of older children would 
affect the decision of having one more child. Both the accumulation of older children 
and the decision of having one more child would affect the probability of divorce. Of 
course, whether to have one more child do not affect the number of children they have 
already had. They also assume that marital tensions leading to divorce are of relatively 
recent origin. Hence, the probability of divorce would not impose any influence on the 
number of older children that couples have already accumulated? By this logic, 
divorce and the first type of childbearing decision enter the system as binary 
endogenous variables. The second type of childbearing decision enters as exogenous • 
variable. However, his empirical study shows that these childbearing decisions and 
the probability of divorce are unrelated. 
In addition to the quantity of children, the quality of children is also important in 
the determination of couples' happiness and their risk of divorce. The higher the 
quality of their children, the larger their gain from marriage and the lower their 
probability of divorce would be. Mauldon (1992) uses children's health as an 
3 This assumption is problematic. It is possible that unhappy couples have already expected that they 
will get divorced in the future well before they confirm the decision of divorce. Hence, the number of 
older children, not just the decision of having one more child, should also be affected by the probability 
of divorce. 
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indicator of children's quality and examines how it is related to divorce. He finds that 
couples having disabled children would suffer from a higher probability of divorce. 
2.2d) Uncertainty 
People decide to get married because they expect their gains from marriage are 
greater than their gains from remaining single. However, unanticipated shocks after 
getting married, such as falling out of love，suffering from serious illness, and being 
unemployed, can reduce their gains from marriage and result in divorce. Previous 
studies mainly focus on how unexpected income affects the probability of divorce; 
however, no concordant agreement has been reached. On one side, following the logic -
of "the division of labour between spouses，,，unexpected increase in husbands' 
earnings and unexpected decrease in wives' earnings may enhance the stability of 
marriage. On the other side, people make the decision of marriage with the use of the 
information at the time of getting married, any afterwards unexpected shock implies a 
pair of originally well-matched spouses is not well matched any more. Hence, any 
unexpected change in income, no matter it increases or decreases, may destabilize 
marital relationship. Weiss and Willis (1997) support the first one. Becker, Landes and 
Michael (1977) support the second one. 
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2.2e) Shared time 
Shared time is a form of interaction between spouses that may increase their 
gains from marriage and prevents marital break-up. Hill (1988) provides supporting 
evidence for this argument. Among various joint activities, he finds that joint 
recreation is the most important in deterring marital break-up. 
2.2f) Taxation 
Whittington and Alm (1996) suggest that different tax policies may work as 
marriage subsidies or marriage penalties for married people. If the tax system has 
favorable terms for couples, it increases their gains from marriage and discourages -
divorce. Their empirical study indicates a weakly positive influence of marriage 
penalties on the probability of divorce. 
2.3) Costs of divorce 
The higher the costs of divorce, the lower the probability of divorce would be, 
and vice versa. It is believed that the costs of divorce are mainly determined by the 
legal arrangement of divorce, the ability to overcome psychological stigma, the 
amount of marital-specific capitals, and the ability to deal with the problems going 
together with divorce. Each of them will be discussed from 2.3a to 2.3d. 
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2.3a) Legal arrangement 
The liberalization of divorce law, moving from fault to no-fault divorce, is 
popularly blamed for the reduction in the costs of divorce and results in higher number 
of divorces. Peter (1986) builds up two models to explain the impact of legal settings 
on the rates of divorce. The first one suggests that neither fault nor no-fault divorce 
has any impact on the rates of divorce and the second one suggests that no-fault 
divorce can lead to higher rates of divorce. Their different outcomes are yielded from 
the difference in their underlying assumptions. The first one assumes that the ex-post 
information about the value of opportunities outside marriage is symmetric，but the 
second one assumes that this information is asymmetric. His empirical study supports -
the first one. Smith (1997) also finds that no-fault separation fails to explain any 
increase in the number of divorces and the change in legal procedures has temporary 
effect only. 
2.3b) Ability to overcome psychological stigma 
If one is more able to endure the psychological stigma that follows divorce, 
he/she is more ready to dissolve his/her unhappy marriage as his/her costs of divorce 
lower. Following this logic, we may expect that people grown up in broken families or 
have already experienced divorce before are exposed to higher risk of divorce. 
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Supporting evidence can be found in Becker, Landes and Michael (1977), Lehrer 
(1988), and Weiss and Willis (1997). 
2.3c) Ability to overcome the problems going together with divorce 
As more educated people are more capable to handle the legal procedures of 
divorce and the subsequent problems，they are expected to have lower costs ofdivorce. 
It further explains why the influence of education on the stability of marriage is not 
necessarily stabilizing. 
2.3d) Marital-specific capitals -
Apart from increasing "the gains from marriage", marital-specific capitals can 
discourage divorce by increasing "the costs of divorce". This aspect further enhances 
the importance of marital-specific capitals in stabilizing marriage. Based on this idea, 
we may think that couples with young children are more reluctant to divorce than 
couples with grown-up children only. The reason is the rearing of young children is 
highly time and money intensive. Divorce would make one spouse with the right of 
custody to bear this heavy cost individually. As it is quite uncertain about which 
spouse would get the right of custody, both the husband and wife would take this 
higher costs into consideration, at least to certain extent. Becker, Landes and Michael 
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(1977) show that the number of children under six have much stronger influence than 
the number of children between seven and seventeenth on stabilizing marriage. 
Cherlin (1977) shows that only pre-school children are deterrent to separation and 
divorce. 
2.4) Value of alternatives and divorce 
The higher the value ofaltematives, the higher the probability ofdivorce would 
be. Hoffman (1977) finds that the economic status of divorced men is improved while 
the economic status of divorced women is degenerated. Presumably, more generous 
social welfare for needy women may increase their value of alternatives and -
encourage them to dissolute their unsatisfactory marriage. Hoffman and Duncan 
(1993) examine the influence of AFDC (Aid to Family with Dependent Children) on 
the probability of divorce of women and their welfare after divorce. They find that 
AFDC can improve the welfare of divorced women substantially, but it dose not seem 
to encourage divorce. 
The value of alternatives increases with the increase in the chance of getting 
remarried. If remarriage is not allowed, couples stay in the current marriage as their 
marital gains are larger than their gains from being single. However, if remarriage is 
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possible, couples get divorced as their gains from another marriage are larger than 
their gains from the current marriage, even if their gains from being single are much 
lower than their gains from the current marriage. Remarriage provides one more 
valuable option after divorce and it makes more couples dissolve their families. As 
younger couples have more opportunities to get remarried, it explains why divorce 
mainly happens to them. 
2.5) Brief summary of theoretical analysis and empirical findings of previous studies 
Theoretically, economists always argue that higher husbands' earnings, larger 
number of children, longer duration of marriage, better matching and co-habitation • 
can work as barriers against divorce. On the other hand, higher wives' income, pre-
marital birth, pre-marital conception, youthful marriage, the liberalization of divorce 
law, and the experience about divorce can simulate divorce. Economists think that 
education may have both positive and negative influence on the probability of divorce. 
Hence, the direction of influence of education on the probability of divorce depends 
on which force is stronger. The relationship between unexpected income and the 
probability of divorce is still unclear. 
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In order to have a more complete and clearer picture about the theoretical 
analysis of the determinants of divorce, diagram 6 summarizes how various factors 
are expected to affect the probability of divorce. In this diagram, the blue, red and 
green arrows show how various factors affect the probability of divorce through the 
influence of the gains from marriage, the costs of divorce and the value of alternatives 
respectively. The black solid arrows show the reaction effects from the probability of 
divorce to its determinants. 
Empirically, firm evidence for the impacts of wives' earnings, the number of 
children, the duration of marriage, the age at marriage, pre-marital birth and pre- -
marital conception on the probability of divorce has been reached. In most cases, 
education can prevent divorce, but exception is present. Many studies find that 
husbands' earnings are negatively related with the probability of divorce, but Becker 
(1977) finds that there is a U-shape relationship between husbands' earnings and the 
probability of divorce. For unexpected income, no consistent evidence has been found. 
Though co-habitation is thought to have negative influence on the probability of 
divorce, evidence is two-sided. The liberalization of divorce law is expected to 
encourage divorce, but no supporting evidence is found. Empirical research on the 
interrelationship between the number of children and the probability of divorce and 
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， the interrelationship between female labour participation and the probability of 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3: Cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of divorce 
In this section, we first introduce the data and estimation method that we will use. 
Secondly, we state the variables that we want to test in this cross-sectional analysis of 
divorce. Then, we discuss the estimation results of males and females separately. With 
the estimation results of males and females, we compare their difference and similarity. 
Finally, we analyze the interrelationship between the quantity of children and the 
probability of divorce. 
3.1) Data and estimation method 
In this thesis, data from “1996 Population By-census" are used to examine the -
determinants of divorce in Hong Kong. This census is a household survey by which 
all the family members of selected household are interviewed. Though it is not a 
survey designed for the study of family issues, it still contains some variables that are 
relevant to our interest. 
However, the use of this survey involves some problems. Firstly, this survey 
doesn't contain some variables that may be important in the determinants of divorce, 
such as the age of marriage, the duration of marriage, religion and the amount of 
shared time between spouses. Secondly, it is natural to think that one's probability of 
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divorce is determined by hisAier pre-divorced variables rather than post-divorced 
variables. But one's historical information is not available in this survey. Another 
problem arising directly from the lack of historical information is those who had got 
divorced and got remarried later are recorded to be married. Though they possess 
some characteristics that made them divorce, we fail to consider their characteristics 
as their determinants of divorce, since they are unobserved to be divorced. Thirdly, in 
this survey, only the family members living at the same flat are interviewed. Family 
members who have moved out or not living at the same flat are ignored. This practice 
leads to sample bias since divorced men who lose the right of custody of their children 
and old couples whose children have grown up and moved out are recorded to be -
childless mistakenly. Also, for some Hong Kong families, some of their family 
members are living in Hong Kong and the others are living in mainland or overseas 
due to cross-border marriage or migration. Hence, we fail to calculate the number of 
children of these families correctly. All of these shortcomings reduce the accuracy of 
our results. 
The first problem is unavoidable. It is difficult to obtain a set of data which 
includes all variables that we want. What we can do is to exhaust all the available 
information to analyze our topic. The second problem is less serious than expected as 
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variables that are more stable in one's life are used, such as one's educational level 
and place ofbirth. Also, post-divorced variables are not totally irrelevant. For example, 
post-divorced income can be viewed as one's ability of eaming his/her living 
independently after divorce. It is especially important for females. The higher this 
ability, the higher the probability of divorce would be. The third problem can be 
lessened by focusing on the observations of a particular sex or age group and 
appropriate data management. As old couples with independent children only are 
recorded to be childless, we only include those aged below 50 in our estimation. In 
most cases, wives would be given the right of custody. In our sample, only 41.7% 
divorced men are recorded to have children; for divorced women, 73.3% of them are -
recorded to have children. Hence, female estimation would give a more accurate 
picture about how children affect the probability of divorce since divorced men are 
more often recorded to be childless even they are not. Furthermore, observations who 
are recorded to be married but the information about their spouses are unavailable are 
excluded in our estimation since it is very likely that the records of the number of 
children of these families are incorrect. Nevertheless, we try our best to dig all the 
useful elements in this survey to detect the determinants of divorce in Hong Kong as 
we have no better alternative. 
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In this set of data, all married or divorced individuals aged under 50 are extracted. 
Then，they are divided into two by sex. So, the determinants of divorce for males and 
females can be considered separately. There are 8357 observations for males and 9418 
observations for females. The descriptive statistics for the variables employed in our 
analysis are reported in Table 1. In our empirical testing, a dummy variable is created 
to represent marital status, with one for divorced and zero for married. Apart from this 
dummy variable, many other dummy variables are created in the following estimation 
and each of them will be discussed in detail in the corresponding section. Definitions 
of all dummy variables are summarized in appendix 1. In general, every dummy 
variable will be used more than once as we have many different model specifications. -
For clear and easy following, uniform definition is held across all model 
specifications. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the variables employed in our analysis 
Male samples Female samples 
Mean 
Income 18461 6 ^ 
Years ofschooling 12.845 11.815 
Age 39.613 37.946 
Numberofchildren L430 1.5262 
Number ofsons 0.745 0.79698 
Number ofdaughters 0.685 0.72924 
% of observations who is % 
Divorced 2.178 3.026 
Childless 24.927 21.915 
Bora in mainland 36.281 33.192 -
Work in mainland 3.494 0.435 
Not in labour force 2.704 46.772 
Since the dependent variable is binary, the logit model is used. The estimated 
coefficient of an explanatory variable shows how the index of the endogenous 
variable in the logit model changes as there is one unit change in this explanatory 
variable. How the probability of the endogenous variable changes in respect to one 
unit change in an explanatory variable requires further calculation. Li the logit model, 
the index and the probability of the endogenous variable is monotonously and 
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positively correlated. Hence, even if we don't make further calculation, we still know 
the direction of influence of an explanatory variable on the probability of the 
endogenous variable. 
3.2) Variables employed in the cross-sectional analysis 
With the reference of previous studies, we will investigate how one's situation in 
the labour market, including his/her income level and working status, affects his;to 
probability of divorce. Usually, husbands' income is found to have negative influence 
on the probability of divorce. However, Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) find that 
there is a U-shaped relationship between husbands' income and the probability of • 
divorce. They argue that husbands with greater deviation between actual and expected 
income would have higher probability of divorce. As husbands with larger deviation 
between actual and expected income are concentrated at both tails of the distribution 
of actual income, it explains why husbands with very high or very low actual income 
would have higher probability of divorce. Besides this argument, their “rare trait 
theory" can also be applied to explain this relationship. In order to capture this 
possibility, we include "income" and "the square of income" in male estimation. For 
female, only "income" is included as previous studies usually tell us that female 
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income is always positively related with the probability of divorce. ^ 
In our estimation, only those aged below 50 are considered. In a normal situation, 
husbands under 50 should be activists in the labour market. Even though they are 
unemployed temporally, they should be job searchers. If they don't participate in the 
labour market at all, it is highly possible that they suffer from serious illness or they 
are disabled. No matter what the reason is, they are unable to work normally. As such 
husbands fail to fulfill the role of breadwinners, we expect that they have a higher 
probability of divorce.^ For wives, the argument of the division of labour between 
spouses suggests that wives who are not in the labour market would have a lower -
probability of divorce. To test this idea, a dummy variable named "not in labour 
market" is created, with one for those who do not participate in the labour market and 
zero otherwise. We expect that the estimated coefficient of this dummy variable is 
positive for males and negative for females. 
Just like other studies, we include "the years of schooling" in both male and 
female estimations. Referring to our discussion in the literature review, "years of 
4 In the survey, the information about pre-divorced income of divorced population is unavailable. A few 
studies suggest that income level may be affected by marital status. Thus, the problem ofendogeneity 
for this variable may exist in ourtesting. Hence, the result should be taken with caution. 
5 It is possible that some husbands specialize in the non-market sector and their wives specialize in the 
market sector. However, these cases are really rare. 
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schooling" can have both positive and negative effects on the probability of divorce, 
so, the sign of the coefficient of this variable depends on which effect dominates. 
Since the positive and negative impacts of education on divorce may just offset each 
other, ambiguity is also possible. 
In both male and female estimations, "the number of children" is included. As 
children are one of the important marital-specific capitals, those with more children 
are expected to have a lower probability of divorce. The estimated coefficient of "the 
number of children" should be negative. Besides "the number of children", we also 
like to see whether couples have children or not at all would matter in affecting their -
stability of marriage. To test this idea, a separate estimation is done. A dummy 
variable named "childless" is created to replace "the number of children" in the 
estimation of divorce. One is assigned for those who are childless and zero for those 
who have one child or more. The estimated coefficient of"childless" is expected to be 
positive. 
Since older couples have fewer opportunities to get remarried and they have 
accumulated more marital-specific capitals than younger couples, older couples are 
expected to have a lower probability of divorce. In both male and female estimation, 
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"age" is included and its estimated coefficient is expected to be negative. 
Li general, the variables discussed above are usually included in the estimation of 
divorce. Apart from these basic variables，we enlarge our interest and test several 
determinants of divorce that may be unique to the situation ofHong Kong. 
hi Lau, Lee and Wong (1995), they report that Hong Kong Chinese are more 
open-minded and have higher degree of tolerance to the issues ofdivorce，pre-marital 
sex and extra-marriage than Beijing Chinese. Though people bom in mainland and 
move to live in Hong Kong are assimilated by the Hong Kong culture, we still expect -
that Hong Kong people with mainland origin are more adhering to the traditional 
thinking and are more unwilling to bear the stigma of divorce. In other words, they 
have higher psychological costs of divorce and are more unwilling to get divorced. To 
test this implication, a dummy variable named "whether bom in mainland" is created, 
with one for those bom in mainland and zero otherwise. We expect the estimated 
coefficient of this dummy variable is negative. 
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According to Hill (1988), shared time between spouses has very strong influence 
on the likelihood ofdivorce. Though we don't have any information about the shared 
time between spouses, we expect that people working in mainland would have less 
time to spend with their families. At the same time，cross-border workers are exposed 
to higher chance of extra-marriage affairs. Both of them increase their chance of 
divorce. A dummy variable named "whether work in mainland，，is created to capture 
this influence, with one for those working in mainland and zero otherwise. We expect 
that the coefficient of this dummy variable is positive. 
hi traditional Chinese society, sons are often preferred to daughters. In old days, -
if a wife failed to give a son for her family, her husband was implicitly allowed to 
have a second wife. After mainland adopts the one-child policy, many couples have 
extra children illegally in the hope ofgetting a son. Ifit is really the case that sons are 
such important in Chinese families, sons should have stronger influence than 
daughters on stabilizing marital relationship. To test this implication, two more model 
specifications are estimated. The first one is replacing "the number ofchildren" with 
"the number ofsons，，and "the number ofdaughters" in the estimation ofdivorce. By 
doing so, we can compare the estimated coefficient ofsons with that ofdaughters and 
determine whether sons are more important in deterring divorce. However, if what 
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couples care about is whether they have sons or not at all, the above practice of 
comparing the coefficient of sons with that of daughters may fail to show how gender 
bias affects the probability of divorce. Hence, in the second model specification about 
the influence of gender bias on the probability of divorce, a dummy variable named 
"whether have no son，，is created, with one for those who have no son at all and zero 
for those who have one or more. If our expectation is correct, the estimated coefficient 
of this dummy variable should be positive after controlling for the number ofchildren. 
In short, we will test how one's income, working status, education, age, quantity 
of children, place ofbirth and place of work affect his/her likelihood ofdivorce. Also, -
we will test whether sons would have stronger influence on marital stability due to 
gender bias. 
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3.3) Estimation results for males 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for males. Model A shows that the t-ratios 
of"income" and "the square of income" are statistically insignificant. However, as the 
correlation coefficient between "income" and "the years of schooling" is quite high, 
0.456，this problem of insignificance may arise from the problem of near 
multicollinearity. To deal with this problem, we estimate "income" and "the square of 
income" in one model and estimate “the years of schooling" in another model. The 
results are shown in Models B and C. Model B shows that the t-ratios of"income" and 
“the square of income" increase a lot and tend to be marginally significant. In order to 
have a clearer picture about how male income affects the probability of divorce, we -
drop all the variables that are highly insignificant in Model B and estimate this model 
again. The result is reported in Model D. Based on Model D，we plot the probability of 
divorce against male income with all other variables hold at their mean values.^ 
Diagram 7 clearly shows that there is a U-shape relationship between male income 
and their probability of divorce. This result is similar to that of Becker, Landes and 
Micheal (1977). 
6 This probability of divorce is stimulated by the following function: 
Prob(divorceX=exp(曰'XJ/[1+ exp( /S 'XJ]; where /3 is the coefficient vector and X includes male 
income ranging from 0 to 150000 and all other explanatory variables whose values are held at mean. 
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Table 2: Estimation for male probability of divorce 
— ModelA ModelB Model C Model D ModelE 
Variable Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Name Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Income -8.89E-06 -1.20E-05 ^ -1.19E-05 -1.05E-05 
(-0.885) (-1.32) (-1.317) (-1.156) 
Income^ 7.36E-11 ~~8.87E-11 ^ 8.84E-11 ~~8.17E-11 
(1.054) (1.338) (1.332) (1.226) 
Years of schooling -1.63E-02 ^ -2.13E-02 ^ * ^ 
(-0.715) (-1.097) 
Whether bom in mainland -0.284 ~-0.270 -0.268 -0.268 -0.320~~ 
(-1.647) (-1.579) (-1.569) (-1.565) (-1.863) 
Whether work in mainland 0.156 0.150 ^0 .153 ^ ^ 
(0.396) (0.380) (0.386) 
Number of children -0.898 ~-0.891 -0.901 -0.891 * ^ 
(-9.989) (-9.958) (-10.015) (-9.958) 
Childless ^ ^ ^ ^ f 7 ^ ~ ~ 
(10.785) 
Age 7.15E-02 7.30E-02~~7.18E-02~~7.30E-02~~6.90E-02 
(5.587) (5.794) (5.668) (5.794) (5.481) 
Not in labour force 0.736 ^0 .702 0.834 0.697 0.696~—“ 
(2.111) (2.031) (2.561) (2.018) (2.005) 
Constant -5.363 -5.602 -5.417 -5.597 -7.064~ 
(-8.73) (-10.874) (-9.027) (-10.871) (-12.835) 
Log likelihood ratio test 138.585 138.079 137.449 137.940 133 081 
i x ^ L _ J _ _ _ J _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ L _ _ _ _ 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
omitted variables are indicated by *** 
Diagram 7: Male income and the probabiHty of divorce 
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In both Models A and C, "years of schooling" has negative but highly 
insignificant effect on the probability of divorce. We may attribute this ambiguity to 
the possibility that the stabilizing effect of education on marriage offsets its 
destabilizing one. 
Across all the models in Table 2，the estimated coefficient of "not in labour 
force" is significantly positive and the estimated coefficient of "whether bom in 
mainland" is significantly negative. Both of them follow our expectation. In Model A, 
B and C，the estimated coefficient of "whether work in mainland" is positive but 
insignificant. -
Following the main stream of the literature on divorce, all the models in Table 2 
show that children can significantly prevent marital dissolution by increasing the gains 
from marriage and the costs of divorce. In Model E, we replace "the number of 
children" with "childless". It shows that childless husbands are more likely to 
divorce.7 
7 In Model E, all variables that have been found to be insignificant in Model A, B and C are dropped. 
The same is done for the coming model specifications ofmales. 
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All the models in Table 2 show that older males have higher probability of 
divorce. This result seems contradicting with our intuition. As older husbands have 
already accumulated more marital-specific capitals and have fewer opportunities of 
getting remarried, they should be more unwilling to get divorced. There are three 
possible explanations for this result. Firstly, younger husbands are more likely to have 
younger children. Their costs of divorce would be higher than older husbands who 
have independent children only. As younger husbands have higher cost ofdivorce，it is 
younger, rather than older, husbands would have a higher probability of divorce. In 
our sample, the correlation coefficient between the age of males and the age of their 
youngest sons is 0.635.® Secondly, in our data, the information of one's age at -
marriage is unavailable. As both "age" and "age at marriage" are expected to have a 
negative effect on the probability of divorce, and these two variables are expected to 
be correlated negatively, the coefficient of "age" in our estimation may be biased 
upward. Thirdly, the dependent variable in our testing is whether an individual was 
divorced at some time in the past and not remarried. The positive effect of age 
probably reflects the fact that older individuals have spent more time at divorce. 
8 It would be desirable to include a dummy variable for the presence ofyoung children in the regression. 
Unfortunately, the age of children at the time of making the decision about divorce is not available. 
9 In old days, people usually get married at early age. Hence, older people are expected to have lower 
ages at marriage. 
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Table 3 shows that both sons and daughters can significantly discourage divorce 
and the effect of sons is a little bit stronger. However, a Wald test is done and it shows 
that this difference is statistically insignificant. The Wald chi-square statistic is 0.135 
with one degree of freedom. The corresponding critical value at 5% significant level is 
3.841. This implies that the null hypothesis of "sons and daughters having the same 
influence on stabilizing marriage" cannot be rejected. In Table 4, the estimated 
coefficient of “whether have no son" is highly insignificant. This result further 
confirms that sons do not have stronger influence on marital stability than daughters 
do. 
Table 3: Comparing the influence of sons on the probability of divorce with that of 
daughters 
Variable name Estimated coefficient t-ratio 
Income -1.20E-05 ~~-1.320~~ 
Income^ 8.86E-11 1.335 
Whether bom in mainland -0.267 -1.562 
Number of sons -0.923 -7.372 
Number of daughters -0.856 -6.658 
Age — 7.31E-02 5.799 “ 
Not in labour force 0.699 2.024 
Constant — -5.599 ~~-10.874~~ 
Log likelihood ratio test (% ^ ) 138.074 
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Table 4: Estimation for the impact of "whether have no sons" on the probability of 
divorce 
Variable name Estimated coefficient t-ratio 
^come -Q.119E-Q4 -1.318 “ 
Income^ ~~ Q.885E-lQ ~~1.334~~ 
Whether bom in mainland -0.268 ~~-1.566~~~ 
Number of children -0.878 ~~-7.075~~ 
Whether have no son 0.358E-01 0.156 
^ e Q.730E-01 5.767 一 
Not in labour force 0.6973 2.019 
Constant -5.632 -10.015 
Log likelihood ratio test (x )^ 137.962 
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3.4) Estimation results for females 
After the discussion for male estimation, we tum our attention to that of females. 
For females, comparable estimation is done. In Table 5, Model A shows that female 
income can destabilize their marriage; however, this effect is statistically insignificant. 
As the correlation coefficient between "income" and "not in labour force" is quite 
strong, -0.497, this insignificance may be due to the problem of near mutlicollinearity. 
To prevent this problem, we estimate these variables separately. In Model B, female 
income can increase the probability of divorce significantly. In Model C, women 
participating in the labour market are more likely to divorce. Both of them show the 
importance of female household time in marital stability. This importance is once -
again confirmed by "whether work in mainland". As it is highly possible that women 
working in mainland would have less time to spend with their families, they are more 
likely to divorce. 
However，as post-divorced variables are used and there may have a great 
difference in the female allocation of time between the market and non-market sectors 
before and after divorce, the above interpretation about how female decisions on the 
labour market affect their probability of divorce may be problematic.^® In the other 
1。Married women may specialize in household work and depend on their husbands for financial 
support. However, once they get divorced, it is quite possible that they need to eam their living by 
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way round, the above estimation may be interpreted as women who can eam their 
living more independently after divorce are more likely to dissolute their unhappy 
marriage. Which type of interpretation is more suitable depends on the variability of 
female behaviour in the labour market before and after divorce. No matter which one 
is better, we may conclude that women with higher potential eaming capacity would 
have a higher probability of divorce. 
Table 5: Estimation for female probability of divorce 
Model A Model B Model C Model D ~ 
Variable name Estimated ~Estimated Estimated Estimated~~ 
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Income ~~4.14E-06 1.05E-05 ^ l.HE-05~~ 
(0.896) (2.845) (3.066) 
Years of schooling ~~-3.02E-02 -2.78E-02 -2.55E-02 -1.44E-02~ 
(-1.865) -(1.746) (-1.665) (-0.911) 
Whether bom in mainland -0.245 -0.227 -0.256 -0.234 
(-1.798) (-1.680) (-1.891) (-1.740) 
Whether work in mainland 1.394 1.522 1.423 l.567 
(3.072) (3.335) (3.149) (3.443) 
Number of children -0.303 -0.328 -0.305 ^ 
(-5.039) (-5.491) (-5.074) 
Childless ^ ^ ^ o ^ 
(2.902) 
Age ~6.86E-02 6.70E-02 6.92E-02 6.17E-02~~ 
(6.836) (6.728) (6.919) (6.152) 
Not in labour force -0.595 *** -0.639 ^ 
(-4.158) (-4.760) 
Constant -5.106 -5.320 -5.128 ^ 5 ^ 
(-10.630) (-11.169) (-10.692) (-12.069) 
Log likelihood ratio test ~107.357 89.395 106.617 66 050 
(_X^  
t-ratios are in parentheses 
omitted variables are indicated by *** 
themselves. Hence, female decisions on the labour market may be very different before and after 
divorce. 
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Across all the models in Table 5, female "years of schooling" and "the number of 
children" can prevent marital failure significantly. Also, women bom in mainland are 
more unlikely to divorce. All of them follow our expectation. Older rather than 
younger women would have a higher probability of divorce, but this result may be 
yielded from estimation bias as explained in the male results earlier. Model D shows 
that childless women are more likely to get divorced and this is also within our 
expectation.il 
In Table 6, once again, sons have stronger influence on stabilizing marriage than 
daughters, but a Wald test suggests that this difference is not statistically significant. -
The Wald chi-square statistic is 0.147E-02 with one degree of freedom. The 
corresponding critical value is 3.814 at 5% significant level. Table 7 shows that 
"whether have no son" would not affect their chance ofdivorce significantly. 
11 In Model D, "not in labour force" is dropped since it is highly correlated with "income". As we think 
"income" is a better measurement of one's decision on the labour market, we just keep "income" and 
hope it is able to capture the effect of the omitted variable. The same is done for the coming model 
specifications. 
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Table 6: Comparing the influence of sons on the probability of divorce with that of 
daughters 
tr iable name Estimated coefficient t-ratio 
Ii^ome 1.05E-05 — 2.8451 
Years of schooling -2.78E-02 -1.746 
Whether bom in mainland -0.227 -l.678 
Whether work in mainland 1.522 3.333 
Number of sons -0.331 -4.l06 
Number of daughters -0.326 -4.0953 
Age 6.70E-02 6.728 
Constant -5.319 -11.168 
Log likelihood ratio (x )^ 89.396 
Table 7: Estimation for the influence of "whether have no sons" on the probability of 
divorce 
Variable name Estimated coefficient t-ratio 
Income l.Q5E-05 2.845 
Years of schooling -2.78E-02 A.746 
Whether bom in mainland -0.227 -i.678 
Whether work in mainland 1.522 3.333 -
Number of children -0.326 4.339 
Whether have no sons -7.89E-03 -0.506 
A ^ 6.7QE-02 一 6.728 
Constant -5.319 — -11.159 
Log likelihood ratio test (x )^ 89.397 
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3.5) Comparison of male estimation results with those of females 
For males, there is a U-shape relationship between income and the probability of 
divorce. This result is similar to that of Becker, Landes and Micheal (1977). For 
females, eaming capacity is related with the probability of divorce positively. If a man 
does not participate in the labour market, he is more likely to divorce; but opposite is 
true for a woman. These results are consistent with the argument of the division of 
labour between spouses by which the gains from marriage can be maximized by 
husbands specializing in the market sector and wives specialize in the non-market 
sector. In our estimation, the impact of "whether work in mainland" on male 
probability of divorce is different from that of females. If a man is working in -
mainland, there is no clear evidence showing that he is more likely to divorce. 
However, if a woman is working in mainland, she is more likely to divorce. This 
difference between male and female estimation result can be explained by the 
implication of the argument of the division of labour between spouses by which 
female household time is much more important in maintaining satisfactory family life. 
Hence, even if males work in mainland and spend less time with their families, their 
probability of divorce would not be pushed up significantly. For females, ifthey work 
in mainland and don't spend enough time with their family, their probability of 
divorce would be pushed up significantly. 
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Most of the previous studies find that both male and female education can 
prevent divorce significantly, but some others find that both male and female 
education has insignificant effect on the probability of divorce. In our estimation, male 
education has insignificant effect on the probability of divorce, but female education 
can reduce the probability of divorce significantly. The influence of education on the 
probability of divorce seems to be varied across different societies. For both males and 
females, people bom in mainland or having more children are less likely to divorce. In 
addition, the stabilizing effect of sons is almost the same as that ofdaughters. 
Comparing Table 2 with Table 5, it is easy to find that the estimated coefficients -
of "the number of children" and "childless" for males are much larger than those of 
females (in the sense of absolute value). However, it does not necessarily lead us to 
conclude that the influence of children on the probability of divorce is stronger for 
males. As already mentioned in the sample introduction, divorced men are more often 
recorded to be childless mistakenly. Hence, it is possible that the influence of children 
on divorce for males is biased upward. 
51 
3.6) Study on the interrelationship between the quantity of children and the probability 
of divorce 
3.6a) Introduction 
As already discussed in the literature review 2.2c，the relationship between the 
quantity of children and the probability of divorce may be bilateral. Couples with a 
higher probability of divorce would have fewer children. As they only have fewer 
children, their probability of divorce would increase further. Each of them simulates 
each other and finally may make divorce occur. Obviously, a more appropriate method 
to examine this interrelationship is to set up a system of simultaneous equations. 
In this thesis, two types of simultaneous models will be estimated. The only 
difference between these two is how the quantity of children is measured. The first 
one treats the quantity of children as a continuous variable and estimates the 
interrelationship between "the number of children" and "the probability of divorce". 
The second one treats the quantity of children as a binary variable and estimates the 
interrelationship between "the probability of childless" and "the probability of 
divorce". Each ofthem is applied to both male and female samples. Before going into 
the estimation process and results, we first take a look on model specification and 
identification. 
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3.6b) Model specification and identification 
In this section, we first discuss what variables would be included in the equation 
of children and the equation of divorce. Then, we put these equations together and 
check whether they are identifiable. In order to make the system identifiable, excluded 
restrictions are required in each equation. To be more careful, we need to examine 
whether we have imposed excluded restriction reasonably. 
Exogenous variables included in the equation of children 
A basic variable included in the estimation of fertility is income. If children are 
normal goods, richer families would have more children. But observation always tells -
us that richer families would have fewer children. This puzzle is solved by Becker and 
Lewis' (1973) quantity and quality interaction model. They suggest that as income 
increases, parents may substitute the quality of children for the quantity of children, 
and consequently lower the demand for the quantity of children. Hence, income may 
have negative rather than positive impact on the demand for the quantity of children. 
When the price of children increases, couples reduce their demand for children. 
Since the rearing of children is very time-intensive, couples with higher value of time 
need to pay a higher price for children. As one's value of time can be measured by 
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his/her eaming capacity and eaming capacity is positively related with the amount of 
schooling, schooling may relate with the demand for children negatively. However, 
one may argue that the job of rearing children is mainly bom by women. Thus, this 
argument may be true for females only, especially for Asian societies. Rosenzweig and 
Schultz (1989) suggest that more educated couples can access effective contraception 
at a lower cost, it also explains why schooling may reduce the demand for children. 
Furthermore, more educated people tend to get married later since they like to invest 
more on the labour market/^ As they get married later, biological constraint leads 
them to have fewer children. With these ideas, the second variable included in the 
equation of children is '^he years of schooling" and it is expected to have a negative -
influence on the demand for children. 
With biological constraint, it is impossible to have the whole desired number of 
children once at a time. As the stock of children is accumulated with time, it is a usual 
practice to include one's age in the estimation of fertility. In addition, younger couples 
tend to invest more in the labour market and like to enjoy more shared time with their 
spouses during the early period of marriage. So, their demand for children is lower. 
The inclusion of “age” can also reflect this difference in preference between younger 
12 More educated people invest more on the labour market in order to realize their retum from 
education. 
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and older couples. 
It is no doubt that how many children a couple demands depends on their 
preference for children. Though it is very difficult to measure preference, we expect 
that those bom in mainland would have stronger preference for children, since they are 
more adhering to the traditional custom ofhaving a bigger family. Hence, the dummy 
variable of"whether bom in mainland" is included in the equation ofchildren. 
In modem society, a lot of commercial means, such as day-care centers and 
domestic helpers, are available to substitute parents' expensive time spent on the -
rearing of children. If one is able and willing to make such substitution, he/she can 
lower hisAier costs of having children and demands more children. In the equation of 
children, a drnnmy variable named "domestic helper" is created to capture this effect, 
with one for those employing a domestic helper and zero otherwise. 
In short, for both males and females, the equation of children includes "income", 
"years of schooling", “age”，"whether bom in mainland" and "domestic helper" as 
exogenous variables. 
Exogenous variables included in the equation ofdivorce 
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For males, all exogenous variables appearing in the male single equation 
estimation are once again included. Of course, the quantity of children is now viewed 
as an endogenous rather that exogenous variable. Hence, the set of exogenous 
variables included in the male equation of divorce encompasses "income", "the square 
of income", "years of schooling", "age", "whether bom in mainland", "whether work 
in mainland" and “not in labour force”. Similarly, for females, all exogenous variables 
appearing in the female single equation estimation are included except "not in labour 
force". It is because this dummy variable is highly correlated with “income”]� As 
"income" is a better measurement of one's degree of labour participation, we hope 
"income" is able to capture the effect of this dummy variable. -
Based on the above discussion, equations 1 and 2 show the structural system for 
males, and equations 3 and 4 show the structural system for females. 
For males, 
Quantity of children =/(probability of divorce, income，years ofschooling, age, 
Whether have domestic helper, whether bom in mainland) (1) 
Probability ofdivorce = g (quantity of children, income, income^, years ofschooling, 
age, not in labour force, whether bom in mainland, whether work in mainland) (2) 
For females 
13 The correlation coefficient between these two variables is ~0.497. 
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Quantity ofchildren = h (probability of divorce, income, years of schooling, age, 
Whether have domestic helper, whether bom in mainland) (3) 
Probability of divorce = z (quantity of children, income, years of schooling, age, 
Whether work in mainland, whether bom in mainland) (4) 
Identification 
Excluded variable(s) in the equation of divorce and the equation of children 
For both males and females, "domestic helper" is excluded in the equation of 
divorce since it does not affect the probability of divorce directly. For males, "not in 
labour force" is included in the equation of divorce but is excluded in the equation of 
children. One may argue that the value of time for men who do not take part in the " 
labour market is lower, hence, their cost of rearing children should also be lower. As 
they have lower cost of rearing children, they are expected to have higher demand for 
children. However, in the Chinese society, the job of rearing children is mainly taken 
up by wives. So, even husbands stay at home for the whole day, they contribute very 
little or nothing to the rearing of children. As the rearing of children is not their 
alternative option of not participating in the labour market, their value of time is 
irrelevant to their cost of rearing children and their demand for children. Apart from 
this dummy variable, "square of income" is also excluded in the equation of children 
for males. For females, "whether work in mainland" is excluded in the equation of 
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children since it is not expected to affect fertility.^ ^ 
From the above discussion of excluded variables, it is easy to find that one 
variable is excluded in both male and female equations of divorce, three variables are 
excluded in the male equation of children and one variable is excluded in the female 
equation of children. Hence, both the systems ofmales and females are identifiable. 
14 Admittedly, these exclusion restrictions are not welljustified theoretically. Due to data limitations, 
over-identification tests cannot be performed. Moreover, some variables (e.g. domestic helper) may be 
endogenous. The results should be taken with caution. 
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3.6c) Estimation for the interrelationship between "the number of children" and "the 
probability of divorce" 
In the first structural estimation, "the number of children" is a continuous 
variable and "divorce" is a dichotomous variable. Maddala's (1983) two-stage 
procedure is used. 
For males, the following structural system is estimated. 
Number of children = Bidivorce + Xfi2^ /z 1 
Divorce* = 7 ^number of children + X: j 2 + fJi 2 
where the number of children is an observable N X 1 variable; divorce* is a latent N 
X 1 variable and is dichotomously observed: divorce=l if divorce*>0 and divorce = 0 -
otherwise. X! is a N X 6 matrix which includes all the exogenous variables 
appearing in the equation of children (including the constant term). Similarly, & is a 
N X 8 matrix which includes all the exogenous variables appearing in the equation 
of divorce. 0 2 and 7 2 are coefficient vectors for X^ and X2 respectively. The 
primary interest of this testing is fi! andr i which are the estimated coefficients of 
"divorce" and "the number ofchildren". 
Firstly, we estimate the reduced form of the system. The reduced form can be 
written as follows. 
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Number of children = X E ! + v! 
Divorce* = X H 2 + v: 
whereXisaN X 9 matrix consisting of all the exogenous variables in the system. 
The first reduced equation is estimated by OLS and the second reduced equation 
is estimated by probit. The estimated Xn^and X U , are then used as instrumental 
variables for "divorce" in the first structural equation and "the number ofchildren" in 
the second structural equation respectively. After substituting the instrumental 
variables in the structural system, all the coefficients in the structural system are 
obtained from the estimation of the first structural equation by OLS and the second -
structural equation by probit. The asymptotic covariance matrix for these estimated 
coefficients can be derived as follows. Define 
P'=(P1,P2') 
Y=(yi'Y2') 
H = (n2,J1) 
G = (n1,J2) 
af = var(vi) 
a2 = var(v2) 
cjl2 =var(v1,v2) 
where J! and J2 are matrices consisting of one and zero so that X J! = X, and X J: = X: 
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For the second-stage OLS estimate of B, the covariance matrix is 
Var(estimated B) = (H'X'XH)-^ + (B, o 2)'(H'X'XH)"^'X'XVoX'XH(HX'XH)-^ 
where V。is the covariance matrix of the probit estimation of E 2. 
For the second-stage probit estimate of 7，the covariance matrix is 
Var(estimated r ) = (O'Vo'^G)'' + d(G' V^'GfG^ V,'' (X'X)] Vo"^G(G' Vo'^ G)-^  
where 
d = ( Y i ) ' 4 - 2 Y 2 ^ 
^2 
and 
^ = N - ^ I ( y 2 i V i i f i "^) 
With the above procedure, the estimation result for males is reported in Table 8. 
For females, similar estimation is done. The only difference is the exogenous variables 
included in Xj. The result for females is reported in Table 9. 
In Tables 8 and 9，both male and female estimations show that "number of 
children" has significantly negative effect on "the probability of divorce". Also, "the 
probability of divorce" has negative influence on "the number of children"; but this 
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effect is statistically insignificant. ” 
Table 8: Estimation for male interrelationship between "the number of children" and 
“the probability of divorce" 
Children equation Divorce equation 
Vanable Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Divorce -0.162 *** 
(-0.1.071) 
Number of children ' ^ ^ _Q ^ jg 
(-2.505) 
Income -5.7E-7 l24E^ 
(-0-918) (-0.550) 
Income〕 *** 2 5E-11 
(0.821) 
Years of schooling -0.063 ： 0 ^ 
(-16.889) (-1.657) 
Age 0 ^ oM~5 
(16.987) (3.424) 
Whether bom in mainland o.l07 .Q 0538 
(3-304) (-0.698) 
Whether work in mainland ^ 5 ^ ¾ ‘ 
(0.206) 
Not in labour force * ^ Q 353 
(2.274) 
Domestic helper o .445 i j ^  
(6.622) 
Constant “ -0.3213 5 ^ 
(-0.750) (-10.156) 
Adjusted R^ o.l83 “ 
Log likelihood ratio test (x )^ — 2 i 188 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
omitted variables are indicated by … 
^ , T^ojudge whether the instruments are good or not, we should check whether the instruments are 
highly correlated with the right-hand side endogenous variables in the first-stage estimation In 
^f^encJjx 2, Table 18 and Table 19 show the reduced form estimates for males and females respectively 
Table 18 showsthat the coefficient of"domestic helper" (not in labour force) in male children (divorce) 
equation is highly significant. Table 19 shows that the coefficient of"domestic helper" (“where work in 
i^amland ) in female children (divorce) equation is highly significant. Thus, the instruments we used in 
the second-stage estimation seem reasonably good. 
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Table 9: Estimation for female interrelationship between the "the number ofchildren" 
and “the probability of divorce’， 
Children equation Divorce equation 
Variable name Estimated coefficient “ Estimated coefficient 
Divorce _o .259 *** 
^ U ^  
Number of children ^ .Q 722 
(-3.25) 
Income -9.33E-06 -8.41E-07 
(-4.70) (-0.308) 
Years of schooling -6.79E-02 -4.96E-02 
(-19.9) (-3.13) 
Age 4.52E-02 5.33E-02 
{ r ^ (5.45) 
Domestic helper o . 440 * ^ 
^  
Whether bom in mainland 7.08E-02 -3.89E-02 
(1.96) (-0.621) 
Whether work in mainland ^ o.60363 
(2.22) 
Constant 0.114 ： 1 ^ 1 
(0.175) (-8.08) -
Adjusted R^ 0.187 ‘ 
Log likelihood ratio test (% ^ ) 70.843 “ 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
omitted variables are indicated by … 
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3.6d) Estimation for the interrelationship between "the probability of childless" and 
"the probability of divorce" 
]ta the second structural estimation, "the number ofchildren" in the first structural 
estimation is now replaced by "childless". Hence，in this estimation, all the 
endogenous variables are binary. The procedure considered by Mallar (1977) is 
applied. 
The structure equation is 
Childless* = /3 iDivorce* + ^^X^ + u! 
Divorce* = j jChildless* + r2^2 + 4 
Both "Childless*" and “Divorce*” are latent variables and dichotomously observed: 
Childless = 1 If Childless* > 0 
Childless = 0 If Otherwise 
Divorce = 1 If Divorce* > 0 
Divorce = 0 If Otherwise 
The reduced form of this system is written as 
Childless* = n : X + Vj 
Divorce* = E[2X + v] 
We first estimate the reduced equations by the probit ML. Then, from the 
estimation ofthe reduced equations, we calculate the predicted indices of"Childless" 
and “Divorce” Substituting these indices into the structural equations as instrumental 
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variables, all the coefficients in the structural equations are obtained by the probit ML. 
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¢1 and O i are the density function and the cumulative distribution of the standard 
normal evaluated at (/5, Divorce* + |3 2^1) respectively, 
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^2 and O2 are the density function and the cumulative distribution of the standard 
normal evaluated at ( 7 ^ Childless* + 7 2 ¾ ) respectively, 
a , = var(v i ) 
a 2 = var(V2) 
N = no. of observation. 
Then the covariance matrix of a / is 
Var( a , ' ) =哪 { \ \哪厂哪3 & \ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ { \哪；—哪3 { \ ^ ; \哪 ( \ 
The covariance matrix of a 2 can be obtained by interchanging the subscripts 1 -
and 2 in the definitions of Z，W!, W〕，W3 and W4； and replacing |3, in W3 by 7 !. 
The above procedure is applied to both male and female samples and their results 
are reported in Table 10 and Table 11 respectively. In both male and female 
estimations, higher probability of childless would drive up the probability of divorce 
significantly. The probability of childless increases with the rise in the probability of 
divorce, but this impact is marginally significant for males only]6 
16 Once again, to judge whether the instruments are good or not, we should check whether the 
instruments are highly correlated with the right-hand side endogenous variables in the first-stage 
estimation. In Appendix 3’ Table 20 and Table 21 show the reduced form estimates for males and 
females separately. Table 20 shows that the coefficient of"domestic helper" (not in labour force) in 
male childless (divorce) equation is highly significant. Table 21 shows that the coefficient of"domestic 
helper” ("where work in mainland") in female childless (divorce) equation is highly significant. Thus, 
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Table 10: Estimation for male interrelationship between "the probability of childless" 
and “the probability of divorce" 
Childless equation Divorce equation 
Variable name Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Divorce 0.37873 ^ i^ 
(1.776) 
Childless “ ^ o 3 ^ 
(3.054) 
Income “ 0.233E-05 -0.336E-5 
(2.027) (-0.746) 
Income" 一 ^ 0.303E-10 
(0.895) 
Years of schooling 0.055 I o ^ 
(8.355) (-0.565) 
^ “ -0.062 0 ^ 
— (-12.226) (4.272) 
Domestic helper -0.989 * ^ 
(-9.431) 
Whether bom in mainland 0.023 _o.l34 
(0-427) (-1.887) 
Whether work in mainland ^ o .061 
(0.348) -
Not in labour force ^ o~3^ 
(1-559) 
Constant 1.806 -2.9758 
(2.939) (-10.735) 
Log likelihood ratio test (x )^ 1099.06 21.188 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
omitted variables are indicated by … 
the instruments we used in the second-stage estimation seem reasonably good. 
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Table 11: Estimation for female interrelationship between "the probability of 
childless” and “the probability of divorce’， 
Childless equation Divorce equation 
Variable name Estimated coefficient 一 ~~Estimated coefficient~" 
Divorce 0.137 * ^ 
(0.439) 
Childless ^ o .352 
(4.106) 
Income 0.152E-04 0.153E-05 
(5.553) (0.599) 
Years of schooling 0.054 _o.02 
(11.796) (-2.355) 
^ “ -0.042 0.039 
(-5.129) (7.033) 
Whether bom in mainland -0.078 -0.078 
(-1.607) (-1.3QQ)  
Domestic helper -i.058 * ^ 
(-7.774) 
Whether work in mainland ^ o .707 
(1.692) 
Constant 0.417 -2.862 -
(0.463) (-13.671) 
Log likelihood ratio test (x )^ 1157.86 70.848 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
omitted variables are indicated by … 
3.6e) Conclusion on the interrelationship between "the quantity of children" and "the 
probability of divorce" 
From the first and the second structural estimations, one ofthe common results is 
the quantity of children (including both "the no. of children" and "childless") has a 
significant effect on the probability of divorce. Those with less number ofchildren or 
being childless would be more likely to divorce. Another common result is that people 
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with higher probability of divorce are more reluctant in having children; however, this 
influence is insignificant in general. 
Comparing with previous studies, Becker, Landes and Micheal (1977) fmd that 
the probability of divorce can have a significant negative effect on the quantity of 
children. Koo and Janowitz (1983) fmd that the probability ofdivorce and the decision 
of having one more child would not impose any significant influence on each other. 
Up to now, different studies get different results about the estimation of the 
interrelationship between the quantity of children and the probability of divorce. The 
different outcomes yielded from different studies may be due to the fact that different 
studies have different model specifications, apply different estimation methods and 
use different data. It is difficult to say which one is the best. In our study, we have 
tried to adopt some more appropriate estimation methods to investigate the issue. 
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Chapter 4: Time-series analysis of the trend of divorce 
4.1) Introduction 
Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) sketch out some main ideas about how the 
increasing divorce rate in the United States is determined by the decline in the number 
of children per family, the increase in the wages of women, the increase in 
illegitimacy, etc. Their ideas lay the foundations for further time-series analysis of 
divorce. There are several other empirical studies focusing on the explanation for the 
increasing trend of divorce. From the current point of view, their methods of 
estimation are out-dated. White (1991) reviews the studies of the determinants of 
divorce that were done in 1980s. He says, "the macro level remains relatively 
neglected in divorce research". In 1990s, there was a dynamic improvement in the 
technique of time-series analysis, but very little was applied to the analysis of divorce. 
Hence, we will spend some efforts on it with the uses of Hong Kong aggregate data 
and more advanced methods. In the following, we first discuss the factors affecting 
the trend of divorce. Based on this discussion, we specify the model that we will 
estimate. Then, we briefly introduce the data and the method of estimation. Finally, 
the estimation process and results are presented in detail. 
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4.2) Factors affecting the trend of divorce 
4.2a) Birth rates and divorce rates 
In the cross-sectional analysis, we have confirmed that those who have fewer 
children face a higher probability of divorce. If it is a common phenomenon to have 
fewer children, more couples would divorce and the divorce rate would be pushed up. 
In Hong Kong, the birth rate has been decreasing from 19.5 in 1972 to 7.9 in 1998. It 
is possible that the increasing divorce rate is directly induced by the decreasing birth 
rate. 
4.2b) Female economic position and divorce rates -
With better education and economic opportunities for women, women are now 
having higher financial independence. They don't heavily rely on marriage as before 
and are more able to dissolve their unhappy marriage. In addition, improved economic 
status causes them to have less number of children. All of these make divorce become 
more common. Hence, it is a usual practice to include the female labour participation 
rate in the analysis of divorce (e.g., Cherlin (1981), Cherlin and Furstenbery (1988) 
and South(1985)). 
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4.2c) Economic cycle and divorce rates 
Some argue that economic prosperity would lead to higher divorce rates, since it 
provides unhappy couples the financial means to dissolve their marriages. However, 
some argue that recession would lead to higher divorce rates, since more families 
would suffer from economic strain and fail to maintain satisfactory family life. Past 
evidence is two-sided. On one hand, Cherlin (1981), and Glick and Lin (1986) fmd 
that economic prosperity increases the divorce rate. On the other hand, South (1985) 
finds that economic prosperity slightly reduces the divorce rate. 
4.2d) Sex ratio and divorce rates 
Some sociobiologists, such as Guttentag and Secord, suggest the sex ratio 
hypothesis (the sex ratio is defined as the number of women per man). This 
hypothesis assumes that women are more interested in stability than men. In society 
with a relative shortage of women, women will be highly valued, especially for their 
roles as wives and mothers. Because men lack the opportunity to form alternative 
relationships with women, they will be less inclined to seek divorce from their current 
spouses. On the other hand, in society with a high sex ratio, men will be less 
committed to existing marital relationships. Because of a surfeit of alternatives 
available to them, men will be less inclined to stay in current marriages and are more 
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apt to divorce. In short, according to this hypothesis, societies with fewer women than 
men are expected to have lower divorce rates. Trent and South (1989) find that 
societies with a relative shortage of women have lower divorce rates. In Hong Kong, 
the sex ratio in the late 1970's and early 1980's is far below unit, especially for the 
sex ratio of young adult. It is because there is large amount of male mainland refugee 
flood into Hong Kong in that period. Afterwards, the sex ratio increases steadily. In 
recent years, it walks around unit. Thus, it is possible that the relatively lower divorce 
rates in the past are due to the relatively higher shortage of women at that day. 
Nowadays, there is no longer shortage of women. It means the current availability of 
women for men is more abundant as comparing to that of the past. If sex ratio “ 
hypothesis is correct, it can be applied to explain the increasing trend of divorce in 
Hong Kong. Though our main focus is economics analysis of divorce, we also take it 
into consideration. 
4.3) Model specification 
From the above discussion, we will investigate the long run relationship among 
the divorce rate, the birth rate, the female labour participation rate, economic 
prosperity and the sex ratio. Similar to the cross-sectional analysis, the first three 
factors may be interrelated. We should deal with it carefully. To be more precise, these 
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I 
variables can be divided into two groups. The divorce rate, the birth rate and the 
female labour participation rate can be classified as household factors and they are 
！ mutually interlocked together. Economic prosperity and the sex ratio can be classified 
I 
as environmental forcing factors that impose influence on the household factors, but 
not vice versa. Under this specification, we estimate how the divorce rate is 
determined by these factors in the long run with the household factors serving as 
• endogenous variables and the environmental factors serving as exogenous variables. 
4.4) Data and estimation method 
Data from 1976 to 1998 derived from "Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics" -
» 
are used. In this study, the divorce rate is defmed as the number of divorce petitions 
per thousand of population. The birth rate is defmed as the number of birth per 1000 
i 
of women aged 15 or above. Due to the nature of the data, the general measurement of 
！ the female labour participation rate is not compatible with our method of estimation.'^ 
Hence, we use the female labour participation rate for women aged between 25 and 44 
instead.i7 It is defmed as the percentage of women aged between 25 and 44 
participating in the labour market. Though we cannot use the general measurement of 
16 The general measurement of the female labour participation rate is the percentage ofwomen aged 15 
or above participating in the labour force. 






the female labour participation rate that is usually used by other studies, it should not 
I be regarded as a drawback. Just opposite, this substitute is much more relevant to our 
！ topic since this is that group of population makes the decisions about divorce and birth. 
! , 
Similarly, as it is the population aged between 25 and 44 makes the decisions about 
I divorce and remarriage, the sex ratio used in our estimation is measured by the 
number of women per man aged in this age group. Straightforwardly, economic 
丨 prosperity is measured by the growth in real GDP and housing price. 
Johnsen's (1988) cointegrating VAR has been widely adopted for time-series 
estimation. However, the traditional Johnsen's cointergation treats all the variables as " 
i 
endogenous variables. When certain variables of interest can be treated as exogenous 
variables during the estimation of the long run relationship among other variables, just 
like our case，ignoring this information can result in a loss of power. This problem has 
been discussed by Johansen (1992) and Urbain (1992 and 1993). Pesaran (1995) 
modifies Johnsen's method so that the distinction between endogenous variables and 
i 
exogenous variables during the process of estimation is possible. This estimation 
procedure has been internalized in the "Microfit" program. For the reason of better 




4.5) Estimation process and results 
The first step of cointegration is to pretest the order of integration for all 
variables. Argumented-Dickey Fuller Test is applied and we find that all the variables 
are I(1). In the above, we substitute the female labour participation rate for women 
j aged between 25 and 44 for the general measurement of the female labour 
participation rate because the latter one is I(0). Including an I(0) variable in 
I cointegrating estimation causes the problem of unbalance. Hence, we make such 
substitution. 
In this estimation, the divorce rate, the female labour participation rate and the -
t 
birth rate are endogenous variables. The growth in real GDP, the growth in housing 
price and the sex ratio are exogenous variables. All of them are fitted into VAR 
estimation. Then AIC and SBC are used to determine the appropriate lag length that is 
i 
； applied to the estimation of cointegrating VAR. In Table 12’ AIC selects three lags and 
SBC selects one lag. As we only have 22 observations, it is too expensive to choose a 
I 
longer lag length. Hence, we adopt the one selected by SBC. We will check the 






Table 12: Selection oflag length in cointegration 
|Order |AIC |SBC 
！ 3 65.250 45.833 
I 2 56.222 41.287 
i 59.295 - —48.839 ~~ 
|0 |26.25Q |20.275 
I 
Before selecting the number of cointegrating vector(s), it is important to decide 
the form of intercept in the underlying error-correction model. As all of the jointly 
determined variables are trended, we include an intercept in the underlying error-
correction model. However, we don't know whether this intercept can be restricted in 
the cointegrating vector or not. Instead of cavalierly positing the form of intercept, it 
is possible to test the restricted form of the vector (the intercept is forced to be 
included in the cointegrating vector). Following Johnsen's procedure (1991), we first 
estimate the unrestricted and restricted form of the model. Denote the ordered 
characteristic roots of the unrestricted model by 入！，义之， A„ and the ordered 
I characteristic roots of the model with the intercept restricted in the cointegrating 
j 
I 
vector by A i*, A 2*,……A „*. Suppose the unrestricted model has r non-zero 
！ characteristic roots, we calculate the following statistic: 
I 
-TS[ln( l-Xi)-ln( l-A. i )] 
I • 
i = r 
It has a chi-square distribution with (n-r) degree of freedom. If the test statistic is 
sufficiently large, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis ofan intercept restricted in 
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the cointegrating vector(s). In our case, the test statistic is 12.99 with n = 6 and r = 1， 
the critical value at 5% significant level with 5 degree of freedom is 11.07. As the 
statistic is larger than the critical value, we reject the null hypothesis and include an 
unrestricted drift in the underlying error-correction model. 
With this setting, the maximal eigenvalue and trace value are used to determine 
I the number of cointegrating vector(s). Their results are summarized in Table 13 and 
I 
I 
Table 14. Both of them suggest that there is one cointegrating vector. 
Table 13: Selection ofthe number of cointegrating vector (r) by maximal eigenvalue 
Null Alternative Statistic |95% critical value |9Q% critical value 
i r = 0 r = l 34.933 m 7 4 28.11 — 
i r ^ 1 7 = 2 五 8 7 3 ^ 2 21.67 
|r £ 2 |r = 3 [2.0381 |l6.9 |l4.76 
Table 14: Selection of the number of cointegrating vector (r) by trace value 
Null |Mtemative |Statistic |95% critical value |90% critical value 
r = 0 r ^ 1 59.m 1 ^ 1 49.56 
r ^ 1 r ^ 2 24.911 ^ 3 5 30.37 
r ^ 2 |r=3 |2.038 |l6.9 14.76 
Once we have decided there is one cointegrated vector, we tum to estimate the 
value of this cointegrating vector which shows the long run relationship among these 
variables. Table 15 shows the estimated cointegrating vector with the divorce rate 
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^ 
normalized to one. 
I 
I 
I In the first column of Table 15，we can re-arrange the cointegrating vector and 
get 
Divorce rate = -0.061 (Birth rate) + 3.867 (Female labour participation rate) 
+ 0.455 ( Growth in GDP) + 1.112( Growth in housing price) + 4.340(Sex ratio) 
Table 15: Estimated cointegrated vector with the divorce rate normalized to one 
Variable name Cointegrated vector Restricted cointegrated vector 
Divorce rate 1 1 
None None  
Birth rate 0.061 ^ ~~~ 
(1.522) ^  
Female labour participation rate -3.867 -5.663 
(-3.064) (-26.732) “ 
Real economic growth -0.455 *** 
, (-0.913) ^  
‘ Growth in housing price -1.112 -0.935 
(-3.865) (-2.971) 
Sex ratio -4.340 -5.872 
|(-3.659) |(-6.616)  
t-ratios are in parentheses 
variables restricted to zero are indicated by *** 
Following our expectation, the birth rate has negative influence and the female 
labour participation rate has positive influence on the divorce rate. Following the sex 
ratio hypothesis, the relative abundance of woman is related with higher divorce rates. 
In addition, economic prosperity (including the growth in real GDP and housing price) 
I 
may lead to higher divorce rates in Hong Kong. 
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2. 
However，the t-ratios of the birth rate and the growth in real GDP are 
insignificant. With the use of likelihood ratio tests, both of them can be restricted to 
zero. After restricting these statistically insignificant variables, column two of Table 
15 shows that only the female labour participation rate, the growth in housing price 
and the sex ratio can significantly affect divorce rate in the long run. 
After the estimation of cointegrating vector, we go into the error-correction 
model, lt tells us whether our model has self-correction mechanism so that the 
cointegrated variables adjust with respect to disequilibrium and finally return to long 
run equilibrium. As the birth rate has been restricted to zero, two jointly determined ‘ 
variables remain in the model. Hence, there are two error-correction equations. They 
are shown in Table 16 and Table 17. 
Table 16: Error-correction model for divorce rates 
Dependent variable: A divorce rate^ 二 divorce rate^  - divorce rate,., 
Regressor Coefficient |Standard error |T-ratio 
Intercept -2.983 1.027 "-2.904 
Eiro,., 1-0.387 |0 130 |-2.983 
Table 17: Error-correction model for female labour participation rates 
Dependent variable: AFLR, = FLR^ - FLR^., 
Regressor Coefficient |Standard error |T-ratio “ 
Intercept 0.529 l.797 2.941 
Eiw,. , |0.065 |o'o23 |2.881 
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From the column two of Table 15, the deviation from the long run equilibrium 
(errorJ can be calculated as follows: 
error^  = 1 (Divorce rate) - 5.663 (Female labour participation rate) - 0.935 (Growth in 
housing price) - 5.87 (Sex ratio) 
If there is one unit of error in period t-l, according to Table 16 and Table 17, the 
divorce rate decreases and the female labour participation rate increases. With the 
decrease in the divorce rate and the increase in the female labour participation rate, 
error,., becomes smaller in period t. As this mechanism works continuously and all 
other things remain constant, error in period t-1 becomes smaller and smaller over . 
time，and finally approaches to zero. Hence, our model is stable and the long run 
equilibrium exists. 
To guarantee we have estimated the long run relationship appropriately, we need 
to confirm that the error term and all the residuals in the error-correction model follow 
their theoretical properties. The error term should be stationary and all residuals 
should be white noise. Diagram 8 plots the error term and it is tested to be I(0). 
Diagram 9 plots all residuals in the error-correction model and all of them appear to 
be white noise. 
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Diagram 8: Bror terni for error correction model 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The divorce rate of Hong Kong has been increasing drastically. However, very 
little study has been done on this issue. Thus, the main purpose of this thesis is to 
examine the determinants of divorce in Hong Kong. Besides employing some basic 
variables that have already been found to be important, we test some variables that 
may be unique to the situation ofHong Kong. Special attention is paid on the study of 
the interrelationship between the quantity of children and the probability of divorce. 
Using the method of cointegration, we also examine what factors determine the 
pattern of the divorce rate in the long run. 
The substantive findings of this study may be summarized as follows. Husbands 
with very high or very low earnings and wives with higher earnings are more likely to 
divorce. Husbands who don't participate in the labour market would have a higher 
probability of divorce, but opposite is true for wives. People with more children or 
bom in mainland are more unlikely to divorce. Women who have lower educational 
level or work in mainland would suffer from a higher probability ofdivorce. From the 
estimation of structural equations, people with more children would have a lower 
probability of divorce. However, the influence of the probability of divorce on the 
quantity ofchildren is statistically insignificant. In the time-series analysis, it is safe to 
83 
conclude that the increasing divorce rate in the past few decades can be explained by 
the increasing female labour participation rate and the increasing sex ratio. In addition, 
economic prosperity would lead to higher divorce rates. 
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Appendix 1: Summary ofthe definitions of dummy variables 
t r i a b l e I P e f i n i t i o n 
divorce One for those who get divorce and zero 
otherwise  
Whether born in mainland One for those born in mainland and zero~ 
otherwise  
Whether work in mainland One for those work in mainland and zero 
otherwise  
Not in labour market One for those out ofthe labour market and 
zero otherwise  
Childless One for those who are childless and zero 
otherwise  
Whether have domestic helper One for those have domestic helper and~~~ 
zero otherwise  
Whether have no son One for those who haven't and zero for~~  
|those who have one or more  
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Appendix 2: 
Table 18: Estimation for male interrelationship between "the number ofchildren" and 
"the probability of divorce": reduced-form estimates 
Children equation Divorce equation 
Variable Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Income 0.156E-05 -0.341E-05 
(1.015) (-0.812) 
Income2 -0.183E-10 0.374E-10 
(-1.595) (1.257) 
Years of schooling -0.066 0.012 
(-19.55) (1.259) 
Age 0.052 0.016 
(27.81) (3.081) 
Whether bom in mainland 0.133 _o.l44 
(5.503) (-2.074) 
Whether work in mainland 0.051 0.068 
(-0.857) (0.422) 
Not in labour force 0.815E-02 0.347 
(0.1163) (2.254) 
Domestic helper 0.49642 -0.337 
(12.74) (-2.515) 
Constant 0.120 -2.744 . 
(1.344) (-10.547) 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
Table 19: Estimation for female interrelationship between "the number ofchildren" 
and “the probability of divorce": reduced-form estimates  
Children equation Divorce equation 
Variable Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Income “ -0.112E-04 0.725E-05 
(-12.01) (3.925) 
Years of schooling -0.678 -0.719E-03 
(-22.88) (-0.101) 
^ 0 ^ 0 ^ 
(23.21) (5.849) 
Domestic helper 0.5416 _0.391 
(14.22) (-3.303) 
Whether bom in mainland 0.099 _o.lll 
(4.343) (-1.911) 
Whether work in mainland -0.192 o .742 
(-1.203) (2.954) 
Constant 0 ^ ^ ^ 
J (10.56) (-13.707) 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
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Appendix 3: 
Table 20: Estimation for male interrelationship between "the probability ofchildless" 
and “the probability of divorce": reduced-form estimates 
Childless equation Divorce equation 
Variable Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Income -0.177E-06 -0.341E-05 
(-0.080) (-0.813) 
Income' 0.235E-10 0.374E-10 
(1.448) (1.257) 
Years of schooling 0.061 0.012 
(12.038) (1.259) 
Age -0.056 0.016 
(-20.92Q) (3.081) 
Whether bom in mainland -0.034 -0.144 
(-0.949) (-2.074) 
Whether work in mainland 0.024 0.068 
(-0.283) (0.422) 
Not in labour force 0.087 o . 347 
(0.865) (2.254) 
Domestic helper -1.117 _0.337 
(-15.809) (-2.515) 
Constant -0.767 -2.744 • 
(6.063) (-10.547) 
t-ratios are in parentheses 
Table21: Estimation for female interrelationship between "the probability of 
childless" and “the probability of divorce": reduced-form estimates 
Childless equation Divorce equation 
Variable Estimated coefficient Estimated coefficient 
Income 0.162E-04 0.725 
(12.412) (3.925) 
Years of schooling 0.053 -0.719E-03 
(11.725) (-0.101) 
^ -0.039 0 ^ 
(-16.604) (5.849) 
Domestic helper -i.H2 .Q.391 
(-16.502) (-3.303) 
Whether born in mainland -0.093 -O.lll 
(-2.744) (-1.911) 
Whether work in mainland 0.102 o . 742 
(0.459) (2.954) 
Constant 0.026 ^ 2 ^  
J (0.229) (-13.707) 
t-ralios are in parentheses 
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Appendix 4: Diagram for various variables used in time series analysis of divorce 
Diagram 10: Divorce rate Diagram 11: Birth rate 
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Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistic: 1978-1998 Source; Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistic: 1978-1998 
Diagrani 12: Lubour participation rate for females aged Diagram 13： Growth in real GDP 
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Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistic: 1978-1998 Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistic: 1978-1998 
Diagram 14: Growth in housing price Diagram 15: Sex ratio 
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